The Effect of Social Security on Private Savings: The Time Series Evidence by Martin Feldstein
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON PRIVATE SAVING:
THE TIME SERIES EVIDENCE
Martin Feldstein
Working Paper No. 314
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02138
February 1979NBER Working Paper 314
February 1979
Summary
The Effect of Social Security on Private Saving:
The Time Series Evidence
Martin Feldstein
This paper reviews the studies by Barro, Darby and Munnell as well as
my own earlier time series study and presents new estimates using the revised
national income account data. The basic estimates of each of the four studies
point to an economically substantial effect that is very unlikely to have
been observed by chance alone. Although including variables like the govern-
ment surplus (Barro) or a measure of real money balance (Darby) can lower the
estimated coefficient of the social security wealth variable, this paper
explains their inappropriateness in the aggregate consumption function. Use
of the new Department of Commerce data on national income and its components
improvesmy earlier estimates and shows that the unemployment variable does
not belong in the consumption function once the level of income and its rate
of change are included.
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It is now well known that private pensions represent a substantial
part of total saving, accounting for some 25 percent of personal saving during
the past decade. Less generally recognized, but of great importance, is the
common practice known as "integrating" private pensions and social security.
A private pension plan is said to be "integrated" with social security when
the private pension benefits to which an individual is entitled are reduced
by the amount (or some fraction of the amount) of his social security bene-
fits. The extent of such integration is of course taken into account in
pension funding with less funding required in more fully integrated plans.
The tax laws and ERISA rules explicitly recognize and permit this substitu-
tion of social security for private pensions. Thus "integration" provides a
specific mechanism by which social security depresses pension saving and
therefore total p:i:ivate saving.
Of course, social security can depress private pensions even when there
is no formal integration procedure. For a worker who has had median lifetime
earnings and who retires at age 65 with a dependent spouse, social security
now provides benefits that replace approximately 80 percent of final years'
after-tax earnings. This high level of benefits leaves little incentive for
any substantial additional private pensions or direct personal retirement
saving.
*President, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Professor of
Economics, Harvard University. The views expressed here are my own and should
not be attributed to any organization. The research reported is part of the
NBER's research program in Social Economics and its special study of Capital
Formation. This note is a reply to the comments of Esposito (1978) and will
be published in the Social Security Bulletin.- 2 -
Common sense and everyday observation make it clear that many middle
income and lower-middle income families do not provide for their retirement
because they expect to depend primarily on social security. This remains true
despite the doubling of real per capita incomes that has occurred in the past 30
years because social security has more than kept pace with that income growth.
Only families with incomes substantially above ~verage, whose social security
benefits replace only a relatively small fraction of the income lost at
retirement, generally save a significant fraction of their income. It is not
the real income level, but the level of income relative to future social
security benefits, that appears to determine the extent of household savings.
I think the real issue is therefore not whether social security reduces
saving but by how much it reduces saving. 1 The potential impact is very
large. Social security taxes in 1977 were $91 billion while personal savings
were only $67 billion. If the money paid in social security taxes would
otherwise have been saved, the magnitude of the current social security
program implies that personal saving would otherwise be more than double what
it was in 1977. Even if half of the money paid in social security taxes
would otherwise have been saved, the volume of personal saving would have •
increased by 68 percent.
Economists are now using different ·bodies of data to estimate the impact
of social security on saving. Aggregate time series for the economy as a
whole was the first type of data to be used. What can we hope to learn with
1
Theoretical arguments can be adduced that imply th~t the effect of
social security on saving is ambiguous, e.g., Barro's (1974) theory of
induced bequests or Feldstein's (1974) theory of the saving effect of induced
early retirement. There is little reason to believe that these theoretical
possibilities are powerful enough to alter the common sense conclusion that
social security discourages private saving.- 3 -
this type of information? During the late 1930's and the succeeding war
years, there was a general expectation among economists that the saving rate
would continue to rise as people became more affluent and a widespread fear
among economists that the difficulty of absorbing this extra saving would
prevent full employment. That increase in saving did not materialize. Even
as incomes rose very substantially in the 1960's, the savings rate did not
increase significantly. This was also the period in which social security
was introduced and in which it grew rapidly. One possibility, predicted by
some of the early Keynesians like Seymour Harrisl and even by Keynes himself,2
is that the growth of social security precluded the growth of private saving.
Multiple regression analyses of time have been used to evaluate
the extent to which the introduction and expansion of social security have
influenced the patterns of savings and consumption over time. There are two
basic difficulties in using time series data for this purpose. The first
problem is finding an adequate measure of the public's expectations of the
social security benefits that they will later receive. Surveys confirm that
individuals do not have precise estimates of the likely value of their future
social security benefits. Although legislative changes create benefit entitle-
ments immediately, these new benefits are only recognized slowly by the indi-
viduals affected. There is no completely satisfactory solution to this
problem. In practice, all of the researchers have used the variable "social
security wealth," i.e., the present actuarial value of the future benefits to
lSee S. Harris (194D.
2
My colleague, Richard Musgrave, recalls the occasion when Lord Keynes
visited the u.S. Treasury and commented that the new u.S. Social Security program
would prevent the excess saving that many economists then feared.- 4 -
which the working population is entitled.l This overly precise measure cannot
provide an accurate picture of year to year variations in the public's percep-
tion of the extent to which they can rely on social security but, hopefully,
it does capture the broad sweep of changes including the original introduction,
the major extensions of coverage and the provision of dependents' benefits.
The second basic problem with time series analysis is that many variables
move closely together over time. Even if an equation is correctly specified,
i.e., has the correct variables and only the correct variables, it may not be
possible to estimate the coefficients with useful precisioh because the varia-
bles are too closely interrelated. This "multicollinearity" problem is more
severe when there are relatively few observations and when there is relatively
little independent movement of the variable of interest. This is a problem
,
for attempts to estimate equations describing consumer expenditure based on
only about 40 annual observations. The problem is particularly severe when
the sample is restricted to the postwar period with less than 30 observations
and much less independent variation in the social security variabl~ (i.e.,
variation that is not just proportional to income). When the equation is
misspecified by adding variables that do not belong, it is even harder to
estimate the'coefficients of the correct variables.
The importance of these problems is illustrated by the estimates that I
presented in my 1974 paper. For the period from 1929 through 1971, the coef-
ficient of the social security wealth variable was rather precisely estimated
as 0.021 (with a standard error of 0.006), implying that an extra $100 of
social security wealth reduces private saving by $2.10. But when the unemploy-
ment rate was added to the equation, there was too much intercorrelation to
lThe idea of "social security wealth" is introduced and described in
Feldstein (1974).- 5 -
make any precise statements: the coefficient of the social security variable
fell to 0.010 while its standard error rose to 0.011 and the coefficient of
the unemployment variable was 1.17 with a standard error of 0.89. When the
sample was restricted to the postwar period, there was even less information
and the coefficient of social security wealth was, as a result, less than its
standard error. This is primarily a reflection of the fact that social
security wealth has much less independent variation when the sample is
restricted to the postwar period.
In his review, Esposito emphasized the fact that adding the unemployment
variable to the equation (with the full sample from 1929 through 1971) made
the coefficient of social security wealth much smaller and not significantly
different from zero at conventional probability levels. Esposito implicitly
rejected my argument that the theoretical case for including the unemployment
rate is much weaker than the case for including social security wealth and
therefore that its insignificance implies that it should be omitted.
Without new data or a new approach, the analysis of the time series data
would be stalled at this point. Fortunately, shortly after the publication
of my 1974 paper, the Department of Commerce published revised estimates of
national income and its components which embody a number of improvements over
1 the information previously available. Analysis with this new and better data
supports my original conclusion more strongly and substantially reduces the
ambiguity introduced by unemployment.
Equation 1 presents the estimate of my preferred specification of the
consumption function based on the revised national income accpunt data:
l"The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States:
Revised Estimates, 1929-74," in U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, vol. 56 (January 1976), pp. 1-38.- 6 -
C = 0.604 YD + 0.111 YD 1 + 0.194 RE + 0.006 W 1 t t t- t t-
(0.061) (0.040) (0.076) (0.005)
+ 0.024 SSWGlt + 338
(0.009) (80)
1929-40, 1947-74
-2 R = 0.99
D.W.S. = 1.45
where C is consumption, YD is disposable income, RE is corporate retained
earnings, Wis wealth, and SSWGI is social security wealth.
The social security wealth coefficient of 0.024 is clearly statistically
very significant and is quite. close to the estimate of 0.021 in my 1974 paper.
The earlier estimate is thus affected hardly at all by extending the sample
period (which previously ended in 1971) and using the newly revised national
income account data.
As I noted above, including the unemployment rate (RU) in this equation
in my 1974 paper had the effect of cutting the coefficient of the social
security wealth variable by half (to 0.10) and to less than its standard
error while the coefficient of the unemployment variable was greater than its
standard error. With the new Commerce Department data, the inclusion of the
unemployment rate has a much smaller effect on ~he social security wealth
coefficient, and the unemployment variable is itself completely insignificant:
C= 0.619 YD + 0.127 YD 1 + 0.236 RE + 0.005 W 1 t t t- t t-
(0.070) (0.053) (0.118) (0.006)




-2 R = 0.99
D.W.S. = 1.43- 7 -
In his own study of the time series evidence, Robert Barro (1978) made
the useful suggestion that the unemployment rate should be specified as
changing the marginal propensity to consume (that is, as a multiplier of YDt )
rather than as a separate linear term. That is quite sensible since the
linear specification of equation 2 has the implausible implications that a
one percentage point change in the unemployment rate altered per capita
consumption by the same real dollar amount during the 1970's as it did in
earlier years when incomes were very much lower. With this suggested modifi-
cation, the equation becomes:
Ct = 0.606 YDt + 0.116 YD 1 + 0.205 RE + 0.006 W 1 + 0.023 SSWGI t- t t- t
(0.063) (0.049) (0.105) (0.006) (0.Q12)
+ 0.162 RUt YDt + 327
(1.078) (108)
1929-40, 1947-74
a 2 = 0.99
D.W.S. = 1.44
The social security wealth coefficient is almost identical with its
value in equation 1, while the coefficient of the unemployment variable is
small and not significantly different from zero. This evidence with the new
Department of Commerce data thus unambiguously supports the conclusion that
social security substantially depresses private saving. To be more precise,
the value of social security wealth (SSWGl) of the population in 1972 was
$1.85 trillion (Feldstein and Pellechio, 1977a); a coefficient of 0.024
implies that social security increased consumption (and thereby depressed
private saving) by $44.4 billion. In 1972, total personal saving was $49.4
billion while corporate retained earnings were $25.9 billion; total private
saving was therefore $75.3 billion. The reduction in saving of $44.4 billion- 8 -
implied by the data is thus equivalent to 59 percent of actual saving in 1972.
To state this same figure in a different way, the estimates imply that,
without social security, saving would have been $119.7 billion (i.e., $44.4
billion plus $75.3 billion) and that this $119.7 billion was reduced 37
percent by social security.
Esposito also discusses time series studies by Munnell (1974), Barro
(1978) and Darby (1978). As Esposito notes, Munnell's basic equation found
a coefficient of social security wealth of -0.030 with a standard error of
0.019 in a study using personal saving as the dependent variable. The size
of the coefficient relative to its standard error indicates that the odds are
greater than 15 to 1 against finding such a substantial coefficient by chance
alone if the time coefficient were zero or positive. Munnell's coefficient
1 is larger than my own estimate of 0.021 for approximately the same period
and data because she includes a measurement of retirement in the equation and
thereby calculates the "gross" effect of social security before netting out
the increased saving due to earlier retirement. She also presents equations
in which current social security taxes are used to represent expected benefits;
the statistical insignificance of this tax variable should be regarded as
evidence that social security wealth is a better measure than the tax variable
and not, as Esposito suggests, as evidence that social security may not affect
saving. Munnell also attempts to isolate a component of personal saving that
she calls "retirement saving" and that .excludes such things as the values of
stocks and bonds and residential real estate; she finds that social security
has a statistically significant depressing effect on this component of saving
lMunnell's coefficient is negative because she uses savings rather than
consumption as dependent variable. If she had used consumption, her coefficient
value would be exactly the same but with the reversed sign.- 9 -- 10 -
collections and therefore increasing the government surplus. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by dividing the surplus variable into its two components
(government expenditure and tax receipts); the government expenditure variable
is then insignificant and only the tax receipts variable is significant.
Moreover, the correlation between cyclical variations in consumption and in
tax receipts explains why including the surplus variable also changes the
statistical significance of the unemployment variable.
Darby (1978) experiments by adding measures of real money balances and
other variables to the specified consumption function. With one measure of
money supply (Ml), his estimated SSWGI coefficient is raised above my own
(to 0.024) while with a broader money supply variable (M2) the coefficient is
reduced somewhat (0.017). The evidence is thus quite compatible with my own
findings. However, there seems no reason to regard the real money balances
as an exogenous variable to be included on the tight hand side of a consump-
tion function: the households choose their desired level of such balance
while the money balances of firms is totally irrelevant in the consumption
function. It is also difficult to imagine how to interpret an equation that
includes both the interest rate and real money balances among the repressors.
My summary of the evidence is thus quite contrary to Esposito's. I
find that the basic estimates of each of the four studies points to an econ-
omically substantial effect that was very unlikely to have been observed by
chance alone. Although including variables like the government surplus (Barro)
or a measure of real money balances (Darby) can lower the estimated coeffi-
cient of the social security wealth variable. I have explained their inappro-
priateness in the consumption function. The availability of the new Department
of Commerce data on national income and its components has improved the
earlier estimates and has shown that the unemployment variable does not belong- 11 -
in the consumption function once the level of income and its rate of change
are included.
Data for the postwar period alone appear to be incapable of providing
useful information on the effect of social security. In all of the studies,
the standard error of the coefficient of the social security wealth variable
is so large that no economically interesting hypothesis can be rejected.
This reflects not only the shorter period but also our inability to measure
accurately enough the perceived changes in the public's expectations about
future social security benefits. This inadequacy of the postwar data makes
it important to examine other types of information, including studies of the
time-series data for other individual countries, cross-country studies and
cross-sectional data on individual households. The evidence of this type
that is becoming available tends to confirm the time series conclusionl , but
the importance of the impact of social security on savings suggests that we
will see many more studies on this subject in the future.
1I have reported cross-country evidence in Feldstein (1977, 1979) and
evidence on household wealth accumulation in Feldstein (1976) and Feldstein
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